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Abstract 
  Agriculture is the focus of much contention in free trade negotiations. The 
Japanese government is against liberalizing the rice trade on the grounds that it would 
threaten “national food security” in the events of such shocks as crop failure, war, and 
embargo. Trade liberalization is expected to make Japan more dependent upon food imports 
and to make the Japanese economy more susceptible to these risks. Using a stochastic 
computable general equilibrium model, we conducted Monte Carlo simulations to quantify 
impact of rice productivity shocks and export quotas by major rice exporters to Japan and 
found little chance for trade liberalization for Japan to suffer from such shocks. 
 
JEL Code: C68, D24, Q17, Q18   
Keywords: agricultural trade and protection; food security; productivity shocks; 
self-sufficiency rate of foods; emergency stocks 
                                                       
∗ We thank Noriyuki Goto, Masayoshi Honma, Ken Itakura, Kentaro Kawasaki, and Laixiang Sun for 
their very valuable comments and suggestions. Research supports provided by the Research Institute 
of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI) are also gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors 
should be attributed solely to the authors. 
† Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom. E-mail: 
227009@soas.ac.uk. 
‡ Corresponding author. 7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan. E-mail: nhosoe@grips.ac.jp. 
Tel: +81-3-6439-6129, Fax: +81-3-6439-6010. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
Productivity Shocks and National Food Security for Japan      Page 2 
1. Introduction 
  The food self-sufficiency rate has been a key focus of debate on Japanese 
agricultural policy. Japan’s food self-sufficiency rate is merely 40% on a calorie basis, a 
significantly lower rate than those of other major developed countries. While this low food 
self-sufficiency rate is a result of the outstanding comparative advantage of Japan’s 
industrial sectors, it brings a concern that food shortages may be caused by unexpected 
events such as crop failure, war, and embargo. Bad weather in 1993 reduced the country’s 
rice harvest by 25% compared with the average yield, which is the second worst year on 
record since 1926.1 There was a soybean embargo due to a serious crop failure in the US in 
1973 and a grain embargo in response to the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1980. 
  These unexpected events made the Japanese government aware that excessive 
dependency on imports for food supply is a risk factor for Japan’s “national food security.” 
The central question involved in ensuring national food security is how to secure food 
consumption despite such uncertainties of food production and supply in Japan.2 
 
1.1  National Food Security and Japan’s Agricultural Policy 
  The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) (2006) established a 
contingency plan to secure the food supply for domestic consumption in emergency 
situations. This plan was put into place to achieve national food security as defined in the 
Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas Basic Act, which had been revised the year before. 
MAFF supposed that the minimum calorie intake in emergency situations should be 2,000 
kcal/person/day, which is about 20% less than usual, and defined two cases depending on the 
                                                       
1  The worst year took place in 1945 with a 33% decline. 
2  This “national food security” is a unique concept compared with the popular concept of “food 
security,” which is often discussed in the context of economic development under increasing population 
and continuing poverty. Hayami (2000) clarifies their difference. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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seriousness of the situation: (a) the emergency case, where supply of all the major crops is 
not enough to support the minimum calorie intake defined as 2,000 kcal/day/person, and (b) 
the warning case, where supply of one of the major grains is anticipated to be 20% less than 
usual. The plan includes several measures to be implemented based on the emergency levels, 
such as promoting domestic production, managing emergency stocks, and controlling food 
markets. Among crops, rice is the most important commodity for Japan. Rice composed 28% 
of the total calorie intake, followed by wheat, which contributed 13% of the total calorie 
intake in 2001.3 The government keeps large emergency stocks of rice––as much as 2.5% of 
annual rice production––and other major crops to secure the food supply, while making 
continuing efforts to increase the country’s food self-sufficiency rate. 
  High trade barriers on rice have played an important role in the achievement of an 
almost perfect self-sufficiency rate for rice. Proponents of these trade barriers argue that 
they are necessary to maintain the overall self-sufficiency rate of food because the supply of 
the other foods depends heavily on imports. Even though trade theories tell us that gains 
from rice trade could be considerable, proposals for free trade of rice have never been 
accepted in Japan because free trade lowers the self-sufficiency rate of food, thereby 
increasing the dependency of the food supply on imports and making the food supply less 
secure. We ask whether it is reasonable to sacrifice gains from trade for the sake of national 
food security and to what extent national food security can be achieved by protecting the 
domestic market. 
  When we critically examine the popular views on this food security issue, it is 
obvious that Japan’s rice production (not consumption) is highly dependent on imports, 
particularly for its input of oil and its products. As Wailes et al. (1993) pointed out, it is 
essential to consider energy security issues in order to have a realistic discussion about 
Japan’s national food security. However, this would make our analysis extremely 
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complicated because the causes of oil-related shocks often include political issues and crises 
as well as speculation in commodity markets. The probability of these shocks is difficult to 
estimate, so we cannot reach any conclusion about such estimates or move into the stage of 
empirical analysis on the food security issues. (Similar arguments can be applied to export 
bans or restrictions, which are often triggered by political reasons, e.g., to maintain access to 
cheap food for people in grain-exporting countries.) Instead, it is productive for us to directly 
examine the validity of the central grounds of Japan’s agricultural policy for national food 
security—even if these grounds may be an invention of agricultural protectionists to protect 
the domestic market. In our examination, we will thus consider the various risk factors 
conceived by those agricultural protectionists. 
  The impact of agricultural trade liberalization is two-fold: (1) deterministic 
efficiency improvements by removal of trade barriers and (2) stochastic gains and losses 
from productivity shocks, whose magnitude can be exacerbated or mitigated depending on 
trade openness. Researchers have often analyzed the first aspect of trade liberalization but 
have rarely examined the second aspect. This l a c k  o f  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  a s p e c t  
sometimes causes people to be uninformed and oppose trade liberalization simply because 
trade liberalization is generally believed to make the domestic economy susceptible to 
shocks from abroad. 
 
1.2  Rice Trade and its Barriers 
  Japan has strictly prohibited imports of rice but recently permitted minimum 
access (MA) import of rice in 1995 and its tariffication in 1999 as a part of the Uruguay 
Round (UR) agreements. The permitted amount is, however, only 786 thousand tons, which 
is equivalent to 8.7% of domestic production in 2001. The effective trade barrier is estimated 
to be several hundred percent (Table1). If this trade barrier is abolished, imports are 
expected to have a very high share in the total rice supply. 
  Japan’s rice consumption is concentrated upon mid- or short-grain rice (so-called T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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japonica rice), rather than long-grain rice. The former type of rice is strongly preferred in 
East Asian countries; the latter type is popular elsewhere in Asia and in other countries. 
Japan’s rice trade patterns reflect this preference. Japan’s three major rice trade partners 
(China, the US, and Australia) produce japonica rice and expect to increase their exports to 
Japan after the rice trade is liberalized. 
  As rice in many countries is mostly produced and consumed domestically, rice 
trade is thin: only a small fraction of domestic production is exported and imported 
internationally. This characteristic for rice shows a clear contrast to other major 
agricultural commodities like wheat. The top ten rice-producing countries cover almost 90% 
of the world’s total production of rice (Table 2). They are mostly Asian countries where high 
temperatures and high humidity dominate. Their production fluctuates based mainly on 
weather conditions. Droughts, cool summer days, and cyclones/typhoons significantly 
damage rice production. While productivity seems to have an upward-sloping trend, it 
sometimes shows sudden drops (Figure 1). As mentioned above, Japan experienced a 25% 
drop in rice yield in 1993. 
  Once we liberalize the rice market of Japan, any shocks in the domestic and foreign 
markets will directly affect such a thin international market. Furthermore, taking account 
of Japan’s strong preference toward japonica rice, the international market seems much less 
reliable as an alternative supply source for Japan. Such facts about international rice 
markets seem to support the idea that the national food security has to be established only 
by protecting the domestic rice market for its high self-sufficiency rate, rather than by 
depending on foreign supply sources. 
 
1.3 Literature  Review 
  One of the most important issues for Japan’s agricultural policy has been 
implementation of the UR agreements. Japan has never regularly imported rice but had to 
accept the MA imports, allowing imports to provide for as much as 4% of the country’s T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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domestic consumption from 1995 on. The MA imports were scheduled to increase up to 8% 
by 2000 if Japan did not accept tariffication of barriers on rice imports. As Japan had a 
strong excess supply pressure due to the rice production subsidy and the declining trend of 
rice consumption, the MA imports were expected to exacerbate the imbalance significantly, 
as Kako et al. (1997) projected. 
  After accepting the MA rice, the next issue was whether Japan should accept 
tariffication of rice imports or continue increasing the MA imports up to 8% of domestic 
consumption. By accepting tariffication, Japan could decelerate the influx of foreign rice. 
Hayami and Godo (1997) investigated politically feasible combinations of policy measures of 
the MA imports, tariffication, and acreage control. Cramer et al. (1999) found that Japan 
would have three million tons of rice imports (about one-third of domestic consumption) 
when assuming an 8% annual tariff reduction after the tariffication of non-tariff barriers. In 
the conclusion, they suggested that food security could be improved by increasing 
accessibility to the international markets rather than by protection but did not explicitly 
answer our question of whether or not the international markets could be reliable 
considering fluctuating productivity in and outside Japan. 
 Cramer  et al. (1993) found a removal of direct and indirect trade barriers of rice in 
all countries would lead to increases of Japan’s rice imports by about five million tons. 
Wailes (2005) did a similar but updated analysis for elimination of tariffs and export 
subsidies and expected about two million tons of rice imports by Japan. These results 
indicate free rice trade would lead to imports as much as 20–50% of domestic consumption. 
  South Korea shares a similar situation with Japan regarding strict import 
protection of rice and food security concerns. Beghin et al. (2003) quantified the minimum 
excess burden to protect South Korea’s domestic markets. They found the current protection 
schemes were significantly inefficient but could not directly analyze the impact of 
uncertainty of food supply from foreign sources because the risk factors, like food 
self-sufficiency rates and domestic production, were assumed to be given as the policy T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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targets. 
  Hosoe (2004) developed a world trade computable general equilibrium (CGE) model 
to evaluate impact of a domestic productivity shock in 1993 under rice price control in Japan 
and impact of Japan’s emergency rice imports on welfare in other countries. The 
productivity shock was assumed to be merely deterministic in the sense that its magnitude 
was calibrated to reproduce the historical event of Japan’s bad crop in 1993. 
  In sum, while strict protection on rice imports is supposed to contribute to 
enhancing the national food security to guard against unexpected changes in the food supply, 
few have considered fluctuation or contingent supply shocks in the agricultural sector in 
order to evaluate the overall benefits and possible losses from trade liberalization. 
Conventional rice sector analyses have reported a significant degree of import penetration 
under rice trade reforms but have inferred little about the impact of agricultural 
productivity shocks transmitted to and from international markets through the liberalized 
trade. 
  In assessing the national food security for Japan, we have to consider a wide range 
of productivity shocks in addition to those experienced so far. As for the location of the 
shocks, we can expect productivity shocks in all the countries, not only in Japan. Our 
stochastic world trade CGE model in combination with a Monte Carlo method provides a 
comprehensive framework to analyze international rice markets under uncertainty. This 
technique is similar to that used by Harris and Robinson (2001) to analyze the impact of 
weather fluctuations induced by El Niño on regional agricultural output and income 
distribution in Mexico. In their model, the productivity of value added was randomized to 
demonstrate the effects of the agricultural productivity shocks. 
  In this article, considering both the deterministic gains and the stochastic 
gains/losses from trade liberalization, we use a stochastic world trade CGE model to 
determine whether trade liberalization is really beneficial for Japan’s national welfare and 
whether it is a serious risk factor for the national food security. Focusing on the rice sectors T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
Productivity Shocks and National Food Security for Japan      Page 8 
in Japan and its rice trade partners, we analyze the impact of the abolition of import tariffs 
on paddy rice and use a Monte Carlo method to simulate productivity shocks in the paddy 
rice sector. In addition, we evaluate the effectiveness of the emergency stocks that the 
Japanese government prepares for use in the event of bad crops and other emergency 
situations. Moreover, we simulate a rice embargo by major rice exporters to Japan assuming 
Japan had abolished rice import barriers and completed reallocation of sluggish factors. 
  This article proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model structure; Section 3 
explains simulation scenarios. Section 4 discusses our simulation results. Section 5 
concludes our analysis with some policy implications. 
 
2.  Structure of the World Trade Stochastic CGE model 
  While using the basic structure of a single-country CGE model described by 
Devarajan et al. (1990), we extend the model to create a multi-country model to analyze 
international rice markets under uncertainty. Reflecting the fact that rice trade partners for 
Japan are mostly Asia-Pacific countries (Table 1), we distinguish 12 regions using the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database version 6.4 Each region has eight sectors, 
including five food-related sectors (Table 3). Each sector is represented by a perfectly 
competitive profit-maximizing firm with a Leontief production function for gross output and 
with a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function for value added (Figure 
2). We assume 0.2 for the elasticity of substitution in the agricultural sectors (paddy rice, 
wheat, and other agriculture) and 1.0 for the other sectors.5 Among the value added 
components, capital and land are assumed to be immobile between sectors in order to model 
relatively short-run phenomena under unforeseen shocks in most simulations discussed 
                                                       
4  For more information about the GTAP database, see Hertel (1997). 
5 Even when we alternatively assume 0.1 or 1.0 for this elasticity in these agricultural sectors, our 
conclusions are found to be qualitatively robust, as shown in Appendix. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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later. Labor is assumed to be mobile between sectors. International factor mobility is not 
assumed. These factors are assumed to be fully employed with flexible factor price 
adjustment. 
  Sectoral gross outputs are split into domestic outputs and composite exports using 
a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. The domestic goods and composite 
imports are aggregated into composite goods with a CES function as Armington (1969) 
assumed. The composite imports consist of imports from various regions; the composite 
exports are decomposed into exports to various regions. For these CES/CET functions, we 
use the elasticity of substitution as suggested in the GTAP database. The elasticity of 
substitution represents the similarity of goods differentiated by origin and destination of 
trade. For example, the elasticity of substitution between the domestic goods and the 
composite imports is assumed to be 5.05 for paddy rice and 2.60 for processed rice.6 
  Although we do not explicitly consider the grain types of rice in our model, the 
nested CES structure approximately reflects Japan’s preference for japonica rice. Share 
parameters in the CES functions are calibrated so as to reproduce the actual trade flows of 
rice mainly from countries that produce japonica rice. The current account surplus/deficit is 
set constant in US dollar terms for each region. Exchange rates are flexibly adjusted so that 
the current account balance holds in all the regions. 
  The composite goods are used for consumption by the household and the 
government, investment, and intermediate input. If the commodity is one of the food 
commodities indicated in Table 3, it is aggregated into a food composite with other food 
commodities. The food composite contributes to utility (Figure 3). For this food composite 
aggregation process, we assume a CES function to give flexibility to our assumptions about 
                                                       
6   As is often assumed, these elasticities are doubled and used for the elasticity of 
substitution/transformation in the composite imports/exports aggregation functions. Sensitivity 
analysis is conducted with 30% larger and smaller elasticity for the paddy rice and the processed rice 
sectors. The results indicate that our findings are qualitatively robust, as shown in Appendix. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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price elasticity of food consumption. We assume 0.1 for the elasticity of substitution for the 
food composite CES function.7  If the commodity is not a food, it directly contributes to utility. 
The complete list of the model equations is available upon request. 
 
3. Simulation  Scenarios 
  To quantify the overall impact of Japan’s rice trade liberalization on the country’s 
national food security, we consider the following scenario factors: (1) unilateral abolition of 
trade barriers on paddy and processed rice imports by Japan, (2) fluctuations of productivity 
in the paddy rice sector, (3) emergency stocks to mitigate the adverse impact of anticipated 
productivity shocks, and (4) quotas on rice exports imposed by the four major rice exporters 
to Japan. We set up 11 scenarios to determine how seriously the national food security is 
jeopardized or ensured by these three scenario factors (Table 4). 
  The first two scenarios, T0 and T1, are often employed in conventional trade 
liberalization analysis as the base run and a counter-factual run considering only the 
abolition of rice import barriers by Japan. The following six scenarios are used to investigate 
the impact of trade liberalization subject to productivity shocks in Japan (Scenarios J0 and 
J1), in the rest of the world (ROW) (Scenarios R0 and R1), and all over the world (Scenarios 
A0 and A1). Scenario S is used to analyze the effectiveness of the emergency stocks the 
Japanese government prepares to mitigate the impact of adverse productivity shocks in the 
domestic sector. The last two scenarios, M and Q, are used to evaluate impact of possible 
export quota imposition by rice exporters. Details of those scenario factors are explained 
below. 
                                                       
7  Generally, the price elasticity of necessities like rice is supposed to be very small. However, there is a 
variety of rice price elasticity estimates ranging from zero (i.e., not significant) or 0.1 to 2.8. A survey of 
these parameter estimates and a sensitivity analysis with respect to this elasticity are provided in 
Appendix. Our simulation results are also found to be qualitatively robust. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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3.1  Scenario Factor 1: Abolition of Trade Barriers 
  We assume unilateral abolition of the tariff and non-tariff barriers by Japan, which 
are reported by the GTAP database version 6 (Table 1). The tariff rates and tariff-equivalent 
trade barriers on paddy and processed rice imports generally reach several hundred percent. 
Neither border barriers in the other sectors nor those in the other regions are assumed to be 
changed. Abolition of such high trade barriers would increase import penetration to reduce 
domestic rice production but would bring about gains from trade as conventional trade 
analyses suggest. 
 
3.2  Scenario Factor 2: Productivity Shocks 
  We assume that productivity shocks happen randomly in the total factor 
productivity parameter of the gross output production function in the paddy rice sector. In 
statistical estimation, we measure the productivity of the paddy rice sector by production 
per acre of harvested area and normalize the productivity in 2001 to unity. We estimate 
standard deviations of the productivity of these 12 regions with time series data for 15 years 
(1990–2004) provided by FAOSTAT while removing the effect of the time trend on the 
productivity (Table 5). We assume that the productivity of the paddy rice sector in the region 
r follows independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)  normal distribution  ( )
2 , 1 r N σ  with 
these estimated standard deviations. We simulate 1,000 Monte Carlo draws for each 
scenario. Among our 1,000 Monte Carlo draws, Australia is predicted to experience a 
productivity decline of over 26%, the most severe decline of the group. Australia is followed 
by Japan. In the other regions, the worst productivity declines are about 10–20%. 
  Strictly speaking, the indicator of “the production per acre of harvested area” does 
not exactly measure the productivity changes caused purely by exogenous shocks because 
farmers can adjust both the numerator and the denominator of this indicator to some extent. 
Considering forecasted or real weather conditions and their anticipated outcomes in market T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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prices, profit-maximizing farmers may adjust the quantity and types of inputs or change the 
timing of planting and harvesting. Their efforts would mitigate the direct impact of weather 
conditions on the markets. If a bad crop is expected to be too serious to recover, they may not 
exert any further efforts to produce additional crops and may make the bad crop even worse. 
Although it would be ideal to estimate pure productivity shocks, doing so would make our 
statistical estimation process and development of the world trade model too difficult. Thus, 
we simply employ the indicator of the production per acre of harvested area as a proxy 
variable of the productivity and conduct a sensitivity analysis regarding the estimated 
standard deviations in Appendix. 
  When an adverse productivity shock takes place in Japan––whose domestic output 
is shipped almost only for domestic use––the country’s domestic consumption will be 
reduced but will be partly supported by imported rice. Similarly, when an abundant rice 
crop is harvested in Japan, the surplus can be absorbed abroad. As rice trade liberalization 
increases Japan’s accessibility to international rice markets, shocks to the country’s 
domestic rice production can be more flexibly managed through imports under free rice 
trade. In view of statistical distribution of domestic welfare, given the same magnitude of 
productivity shocks, trade liberalization itself will shift the mean of welfare distribution 
upward and will decrease the standard deviation of welfare distribution (the upper graph of 
Figure 4). In this case, whether a productivity shock is negative or positive, trade 
liberalization will always bring about preferable impact on welfare distribution. 
  In contrast to these cases with productivity shocks in Japan, when an adverse 
productivity shock takes place in the rest of the world, particularly in China, the US, and 
Australia, Japan’s imports from these countries will be jeopardized. Rice trade liberalization 
increases Japan’s dependency on imported food and thus can exacerbate the adverse impact 
of their productivity shocks to Japan. This is the point that agricultural protectionists 
emphasize. However, if a positive productivity shock takes place in those countries, Japan 
can conversely gain by the same mechanism. As the productivity parameter, by definition, T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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distributes around the mean of productivity shocks abroad, such productivity shocks as a 
whole  will not seriously deteriorate the mean of welfare distribution in Japan but will 
increase its standard deviation while trade liberalization brings deterministic gains through 
improvements of resource allocation (the lower graph of Figure 4). In this case, without 
combining the impact of trade liberalization with those of productivity shocks on the 
distribution of welfare, we cannot immediately judge whether or not trade liberalization is 
always welfare-improving. Trade liberalization makes the lower tail of the welfare 
distribution thicker. This implies that welfare is likely to be worse with rice trade 
liberalization than without it. This could lead to deterioration of overall welfare for those 
who have (strongly) risk-averse preferences. 
 
3.3  Scenario Factor 3: Emergency Stocks 
  Preparing emergency stocks is a popular measure used for coping with bad crops. 
The impact of the rice supply shock in 1993 was exacerbated partly by the government-led 
restructuring of Japan’s food system. The government had significantly reduced its rice 
stocks to 0.23 million tons, covering 2.5% of the average annual production. After the bad 
harvest in 1993, the government increased the size of the emergency stocks to 1.5 million 
tons. While the increased stocks made the food supply more secure, maintaining those 
stocks was more costly. We have to assess the potential of the emergency stocks to stabilize 
the domestic market and achieve better national welfare during bad crop periods. 
  The size of Japan’s emergency stocks is assumed to be as much as 1.5 million tons. 
This is the amount officially kept by the Japanese government and is equivalent to about 
17% of Japan’s annual production in 2001. We assume that this emergency stock is released 
only when a negative productivity shock takes place in Japan so as to maintain the original 
amount of the domestic paddy rice supply. When the losses of paddy rice production exceed 
the size of emergency stocks prepared in advance, the market mechanism starts to work 
with a flexible price adjustment and begins to increase imports. The emergency stocks T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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truncate a part of the lower shoulder of the distribution of the rice supply (Figure 5). 
  For the simplicity of our comparative statics, we assume that the emergency stocks 
were prepared before the shocks and that the release of the emergency stocks does not bring 
any capital gains or losses to the government. By subtracting the storage costs of the 
emergency stocks from their expected social benefits measured with a welfare indicator, we 
can quantify the net benefits of the emergency stocks. 
  Although one of the largest agenda items in the Doha round trade negotiation is 
reduction of agricultural trade barriers, particularly in developed countries, further than 
that achieved in the UR, it will take several more years to conclude the negotiation. In the 
meantime, the government will not liberalize the domestic rice market soon. Thus, in this 
particular Scenario S, we do not assume any trade liberalization but only productivity 
shocks all over the world to evaluate the effectiveness of the current stock size.8 By 
comparing the simulation results of Scenario A0 with those of Scenario S, we can quantify 
the benefits of the emergency stocks. Among the 1,000 draws in our Monte Carlo simulation, 
493 cases are expected to bring about negative productivity shocks in Japan. The emergency 
stocks are found to be large enough to fully cover the lost rice yield in 95% of those negative 
productivity cases. 
 
3.4  Scenario Factor 4: Export Quotas 
  While productivity shocks jeopardize the rice supply every year, export bans could 
bring about damage to Japan––as protectionists often worry. This damage could be 
particularly serious if Japan commits to rice imports and has completed reallocation of 
sluggish factors (capital and land) from the paddy rice sector to the other sectors in response 
to changes in rice prices induced by the trade liberalization. To depict such a mid- or 
                                                       
8  If we assume rice trade liberalization simultaneously, we would have a better welfare outcome in its 
mean and its standard deviation, as the previous simulation results have shown. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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long-term equilibrium after completion of factor reallocation, we first compute an 
equilibrium assuming rice trade liberalization with inter-sectoral mobility of capital and 
land as well as labor. As the price gap between the domestic and international rice markets 
indicates, factors originally employed by the paddy rice sector will move out to other sectors. 
Using this equilibrium as a new reference equilibrium––let it be referred to as the 
intermediate equilibrium––and simulate productivity shocks without (Scenario M) and with 
export quotas set by the four major rice exporters to Japan (Scenario Q), where we again 
prohibit inter-sectoral mobility of capital and land (but allow labor mobility) as Figure 6 
indicates. 
  As the paddy rice sector in Japan would have already contracted more seriously in 
the intermediate equilibrium, Japan would be found more vulnerable to shocks and export 
quota imposition in the rice sector. The size of the export quota is assumed to be as large as 
the original MA import level. 
 
4. Simulation  Results 
  We simulate random productivity shocks and various policies and quantify the 
costs and benefits of trade liberalization for Japanese economy. Their simulation results are 
summarized as follows. 
 
4.1  Deterministic Impact of Trade Liberalization 
  When we assume abolition of all the tariff and non-tariff barriers on paddy and 
processed rice imports by Japan (Scenario T1), we obtain intuitive results (Table 6). Imports 
of paddy and processed rice would surge to reduce Japan’s domestic production of paddy rice 
by 49%. This would result in a significant decline of the self-sufficiency rate of rice from 94% 
to 73%. Rice consumption would be increased by 10% due to consumers exploiting the price 
decrease of rice. As a result, overall welfare impact measured with equivalent variations 
(EV) would be 6,749 million US dollars, which is 0.17% of Japan’s GDP (Table 7). Most other T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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Asia-Pacific countries would also gain. China would, however, suffer slightly by increasing 
its rice exports at the sacrifice of its rice consumption, because rice accounts for a large 
share of total food consumption but is assumed to be little substitutable with other foods in 
our CGE model9. 
 
4.2  Productivity Shocks in the Rest of the World 
  People are often concerned that when we are heavily dependent on foreign supply 
sources for rice, the food supply could be insecure due to unforeseen productivity shocks in 
other countries. When we carry out Monte Carlo simulations with Scenarios R0 and R1 and 
compare their results with those of Scenarios T0 and T1, we can determine whether or not 
these concerns are reasonable. The results of Scenario R0 show no change from those of 
Scenario T0 in the mean of Japan’s EV but do show some change in its volatility (Table 8, 
Figure 7).10 The welfare distribution of Scenario R0 (and Scenarios J0 and A0, discussed 
later) indicates that there would be no statistically significant chance for Japan to attain the 
deterministic gain (as much as 6,749 million US dollars) achieved in Scenario T1 without 
liberalizing rice imports. 
  Abolition of trade barriers on rice imports would increase the penetration of foreign 
rice and lower Japan’s rate of self-sufficiency for rice. Imports are subject to productivity 
shocks abroad. This situation is described by Scenario R1. Its simulation results show that 
trade liberalization would increase both the mean and the standard deviation of EV 
compared with those of Scenario R0 (Table 8, Figure 7). This increase of the volatility itself 
is often regarded as a risk factor for Japan but would not be so large that it could provide a 
statistically significant chance for Japan to suffer negative welfare impact. Furthermore, 
                                                       
9  Note that the elasticity of substitution in the food composite is assumed to be as small as 0.1. 
10  The EV is found to be slightly negative in Scenarios J0 and A0, where we assume only productivity 
shocks. This is due to the concavity of the utility function, which implies risk-averseness of preference 
represented by the nested CES utility function. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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even if the worst case in terms of welfare came true, the welfare level achieved under free 
rice trade in Scenario R1 would be better than the welfare level without free rice trade in 
Scenario R0. 
  The impact of foreign-made productivity shocks can be confirmed by examining 
import prices for Japan (Figure 8). While the impact of rice trade liberalization would be 
overwhelming and would decrease the import price of processed rice by about 80%, the 
fluctuations of the import price of processed rice seem to be almost nil. As we assume small 
elasticity of substitution (=0.1) in the food composite CES function, the household’s rice 
consumption would not show any visible fluctuations (Figure 9). 
 
4.3  Productivity Shocks in Japan 
  When we assume productivity shocks in Japan, the value of trade liberalization 
under productivity shocks can be assessed from a different viewpoint. The simulation 
results of Scenario J0 show that productivity shocks in Japan without trade liberalization 
would bring about significantly large volatility of EV (Table 8, Figure 10). This is because 
the domestic market is isolated from alternative supply sources in foreign countries due to 
high trade barriers. 
  Given the productivity shocks in Japan, the trade liberalization would bring the 
country a double-dividend (Scenario J1). That is, the mean of EV would increase, but its 
volatility would decrease. This implies that a higher welfare level would be achieved more 
securely by trade liberalization. By integrating the domestic market with foreign ones, we 
can pool the risk of productivity shocks internationally. As the welfare distribution in 
Scenario J1 shows, there would be no possibility that Japan would be worse off under free 
rice trade than it is under the status quo.   
 
4.4 Impact  of  Productivity  Shocks All Over the World 
  Comparing the simulation results of Scenarios R0, R1, J0, and J1, we find that the T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
Productivity Shocks and National Food Security for Japan      Page 18 
impact of productivity shocks in Japan would be the dominant factor for its economy. Thus, 
when we assume random productivity shocks all over the world with and without trade 
liberalization, the simulation results of Scenarios A0 and A1 would be similar to those of 
Scenarios J0 and J1, respectively (Table 8, Figure 11). These results do not support the idea 
that trade liberalization—even under uncertainty of productivity shocks—would be a risky 
policy for the Japanese economy. 
  While we have described distributions of EV, we can also obtain distributions for 
consumption of rice and other foods, which imply calorie intake (Figure 12). Rice trade 
liberalization would increase the mean of calorie intake but would decrease its volatility. 
Finally, none of these simulation results indicate any serious food shortages defined as the 
warning level (20% less supply of a certain food) or the emergency level (calorie intake lower 
than 2,000 kcal/day/person). 
 
4.5  Effectiveness of Emergency Stocks 
  Releasing the emergency stocks in bad crop situations in Scenario S, the upper tail 
of the price distribution would become thinner (Figure 13). The highest price of processed 
rice would be 1.17 in Scenario S, while it would be 1.37 in Scenario A0. The distribution of 
rice consumption would be negatively skewed by the release of emergency stocks (Figure 
14). 
  The release of emergency stocks seems to succeed in stabilizing the domestic 
market and securing the rice supply. However, the overall welfare impact would not be so 
remarkable. The emergency stocks would increase the mean of EV by 108 million US dollars, 
compared with the result of Scenario A0; the volatility of EV would not be decreased 
markedly (Table 8, Figure 15).11 
                                                       
11 If we double the assumed standard deviation of the paddy rice productivity distribution in all the 
regions, the benefit of the emergency stock would reach 265 million US dollars. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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  The issue is how effectively the emergency stocks could mitigate welfare 
deterioration. MAFF (2001) reports that the annual storage costs of the emergency stocks in 
Japan reach 150 million US dollars. When we regard only improvements in the mean of EV 
as the social benefit of the emergency stocks—omitting capital gains and losses from the 
release of stocks—the emergency stocks would not seem worth maintaining for risk-neutral 
or moderately risk-averse people. This result suggests that we should reduce the amount of 
emergency stocks or should keep them somewhere abroad, where cheaper storage costs are 
offered. For example, annual storage costs are estimated to be 22.5 US dollars per paddy rice 
ton in Thailand by the International Crop Reserve Research Workshop (2001). In this case, 
the annual storage costs would amount to 34 million US dollars. Although we would have to 
bear the risk of transportation problems between the distant warehouses and Japan, the 
expected benefits of the rice stock stored abroad could be larger than the storage costs. 
 
4.6  Impact of Export Quotas 
  If we consider the full inter-sectoral reallocation of factors induced by the rice trade 
liberalization by Japan, we find more drastic contraction of the domestic paddy rice sector in 
Japan, as the intermediate equilibrium suggests (Table 9). The results indicate that the 
domestic production of paddy rice would become almost nil. Land, which is the 
sector-specific factor for the agricultural sectors, would be reallocated from the paddy rice 
sector to the other two agricultural sectors, while its price would fall significantly, mainly 
due to the contraction of the paddy rice sector. 
  After computing the intermediate equilibrium, we assume the immobility of capital 
and land among sectors in simulations of productivity shocks alone (Scenario M) and those 
with export quotas (Scenario Q). As the reallocation of all the factors in the above-mentioned 
intermediate situation would intensify the welfare improvements by the rice trade 
liberalization, the mean of the welfare impact would be found larger in Scenario M (14,347 
million US dollars) (upper panel of Table 10) than that in Scenario A1 (6,707 million US T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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dollars) (Table 8). (Note that the only difference in assumption between Scenarios A1 and M 
is the inter-sectoral mobility of capital and land.) 
  Simulating the concerns of protectionists, we assume export quotas by the four 
major rice exporters to Japan. When they limit the volume of paddy rice exports to as low as 
the original MA level, Japan would be severely affected. While the gains from trade have 
been found remarkable in the previous simulations, Japan would suffer far larger welfare 
deterioration in this scenario (lower panel of Table 10). Moreover, Japan’s calorie intake 
would become significantly lower than the emergency level defined by the MAFF. As 
indicated in Figure 16, Japan’s calorie intake would be comparable to that in extremely poor 
African countries like Eritrea, Congo, and Burundi in 2001–2003. 12   No amount of 
emergency stock that Japan could realistically hold would cover such a huge loss of food. 
  We should consider two points in interpreting these results. One is that while we 
conducted a Monte Carlo simulation with respect to the productivity shock, we introduced 
the export quotas in a deterministic manner. That is, the welfare impact of Scenario Q 
suggests only conditional welfare impact given the imposition of export quotas. In this case, 
depending on the assumption about the probability that export quotas are set by the four 
countries, our overall evaluation would differ. If we expect such an emergency situation to 
take place frequently, such as once in ten years, the overall net benefit of the rice trade 
liberalization would be negative. In contrast, if the emergency situation were to happen as 
seldom as once in 100 years, we may well interpret the adverse impact of the export quota as 
being not so large considering gains attained in usual situations. 
  Historically speaking, Japan has experienced an effective embargo only once, 
during World War II. Another brief embargo-like situation occurred in 1973, when the US 
halved its soybean exports for two months. Recently, while some net rice importers or 
marginal exporters like the Philippines, China, and Indonesia have banned or restricted rice 
                                                       
12 Source:  FAOSTAT. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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exports in 2008, Thailand, a large net rice exporter, stated it would never restrict rice 
exports. Cambodia, another net rice exporter, had set a ban on its rice exports for two 
months but resumed exporting in May 2008. In addition, the US and Australia––the major 
rice exporters for Japan––have not taken any special measures for rice in reaction to the 
recent commodity price boom. It should be noted that three out of these four major rice 
exporters to Japan have not set any rice export restrictions after the end of World War II. 
  The second point to consider in interpreting the results is that while Japan’s rice 
trade liberalization and the resulting contraction of its domestic production indicate its 
commitment to foreign supply sources, these counterpart countries are also supposed to 
commit their exports to Japan. Comparing the welfare impact in Scenarios M and Q, we find 
that the US and Australia would suffer from their own export quotas while China and 
Thailand would slightly gain. For those two countries that would stand to lose from 
imposing export quotas, it would be unreasonable to impose such quotas. Although we can 
only guess about the probability of their imposing export quotas, the probability would not 
be expected to be high considering the increasing mutual interdependence in the recent 
world economy. 
 
5. Concluding  Remarks 
  To analyze the impact of factors that can secure or endanger Japan’s national food 
security, we developed a stochastic world trade computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model and carried out Monte Carlo simulations. The major findings of our analysis are as 
follows. (1) If rice productivity shocks are anticipated abroad, there is no statistically 
significant chance for the Japanese economy to be worse off under free rice trade even 
though fluctuations of the country’s welfare would increase due to foreign-made productivity 
shocks. (2) If productivity shocks are anticipated in the domestic rice sector in Japan, rice 
trade liberalization would not only increase the mean of welfare, but would also decrease its 
volatility. Combining these two findings, we can conclude that protection of the domestic T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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rice market harms rather than ensures Japan’s national food security. (3) The current policy 
to secure the rice supply with emergency stocks is not effective in the sense that the 
expected gains achieved by the emergency stocks are obviously less than the annual costs for 
storing these stocks. This implies that the optimal size of the emergency stock should be 
much less than the current size and that the emergency stock should be kept in some other 
countries that offer cheaper storage costs. (4) If export quotas were set by the four major rice 
exporters to Japan, Japan would considerably suffer. However, two of them would also 
suffer from their own quota imposition, so they would be little likely to impose such quotas. 
As long as this continues to be true, the overall benefits of rice trade liberalization would be 
positive for Japan. 
  Some reservations regarding our analysis should be considered. In our Monte Carlo 
simulations, we assumed that productivity shocks follow normal distribution. However, 
nature sometimes brings more disastrous crop failures than we expect. Households are often 
very sensitive to a slight shortfall of essential commodities like food but do not benefit much 
from a good harvest once they are satisfied with their level of food consumption, particularly 
in developed countries. We can verify our simulation results considering other distributions 
for productivity shocks and functional forms for the household utility function. 
  In addition to the official emergency stocks, there are rice inventories held by 
private agents like dealers. Such private inventories also contribute to mitigating shortfalls 
of the rice supply. We would have found the effectiveness of the official emergency stocks 
much smaller if we had considered these private stocks. 
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[Tables and Figures for the Main Text] 
Table 1:  Rice Imports and their Trade Barriers in Japan 
Value Trade Barriers Value Trade Barriers
Imports from: [mil. USD] [%] [mil. USD] [%]
China 1.0 1,000 43.9 1,135
India 0.4 0 1.5 829
Indonesia 0.0 0 1.5 0
Bangladesh 0.0 0 0.1 929
Vietnam 0.2 0 3.7 929
Thailand 0.0 0 27.8 1,186
Philippines 0.0 0 1.4 0
US 33.2 804 65.0 929
Australia 7.4 804 28.0 927
Rest of Asia 1.0 581 4.2 453
Other Countries 2.4 30 6.1 274
Total 45.6 183.2
Processed Rice Paddy Rice
 
Note: Trade barriers consist of tariff and tariff-equivalent non-tariff barriers. 
Source: GTAP database version 6. 
 














Total 597,657 100.0  
Source: FAOSTAT 
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Other Countries  
Note: Asterisks indicate food commodities used for the food composite. 
 
Table 4:  Scenario Design 
T 0 --- - -
T1 x - - - -
R0 - - x - -
R1 x - x - -
J0 - x - - -
J1 x x - - -
A0 - x x - -
A 1 xxx - -
S- x x x -
M xxx - -
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Table 5:  Regression Results of Paddy Rice Productivity 
  [Dependent variable: rice productivity index (2001=1.00)] 
Min. Max.
Japan –9.7352 0.0053 0.0801 0.088 0.75 1.31
(–1.02) (1.12)
China –12.9460 0.0070 0.0261 0.606 0.91 1.08
(–4.16)** (4.47)**
India –15.6576 0.0083 0.0423 0.453 0.87 1.16
(–3.1)** (3.28)**
Indonesia –4.2802 0.0026 0.0186 0.304 0.94 1.07
(–1.93)* (2.38)**
Bangladesh –47.7156 0.0243 0.0467 0.854 0.84 1.13
(–8.57)** (8.73)**
Vietnam –54.6946 0.0278 0.0159 0.985 0.95 1.05
(–28.85)** (29.33)**
Thailand –35.8382 0.0184 0.0295 0.893 0.89 1.10
(–10.17)** (10.43)**
Philippines –22.8654 0.0119 0.0502 0.548 0.83 1.16
(–3.82)** (3.97)**
US –26.4873 0.0137 0.0366 0.752 0.86 1.11
(–6.07)** (6.28)**
Australia –5.9156 0.0034 0.0885 0.031 0.74 1.25
(–0.56) (0.65)
–19.6074 0.0103 0.0212 0.836 0.94 1.07
(–7.76)** (8.14)**












Intercept Time Trend R
2
 
Note:   T-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate parameters are significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels. 
  Means and standard deviations of the Monte Carlo draws are all consistent with 
those of the original estimates for the residuals. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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Table 6:  Simulation Results of Scenario T1 for Japan 
Output Consumption Imports Exports
Paddy Rice –48.7 9.5 1,545.8 111.6
Wheat 0.5 2.8 2.8 –2.4
Other Agriculture 0.8 2.7 3.8 –2.4
Processed Rice –36.8 10.2 1,217.4 85.8
Other Food 2.4 2.9 1.2 1.9
Manufacturing 0.4 –0.3 –0.8 1.1
Services –0.0 –0.1 –0.7 0.7
Transportation –0.1 –0.1 –0.8 0.6
Output Consumption Imports Exports
Paddy Rice –37.3 –46.2 –71.6 –17.0
Wheat 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.2
Other Agriculture 2.8 2.6 1.4 1.3
Processed Rice –37.8 –49.5 –80.7 –5.9
Other Food 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.2
Manufacturing 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.3
Services –0.0 –0.0 0.3 0.3
Transportation –0.0 –0.0 0.3 0.4
Changes in Quantity [%]
Changes in Price [%]
 
Note: Changes from the Base (Scenario T0). 
 
 













Rest of Asia 280 0.02
Other Countries –656 -0.01
Total 8,354  
 T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
Productivity Shocks and National Food Security for Japan      Page 30 
Table 8:  Simulation Scenarios and Summary Statistics of Simulation Results 
Mean
[mil. USD] [%]
T0 - - - - 0 0 94.0
T1 x - - - 6,749 0 73.4
R0 - - x - 1 25 94.0
R1 x - x - 6,750 95 73.6
J0 - x - - –192 1168 93.7
J1 x x - - 6,707 402 73.0
A0 - x x - –191 1169 93.7
A1 x x x - 6,707 416 73.3
S - x x x –83 1009 91.8
S.D.















Note:  Distribution of Japan's EV for each scenario is also shown in Figures 6, 9, 10, and 
14. 
 
Table 9:  Simulation Results for the Intermediate Equilibrium for Japan 
Output Consumption Imports
Capital Labor Land
Paddy Rice –97.2 16.3 5012.9 –97.3 –97.3 –96.6
Wheat 46.3 5.5 –5.0 42.2 42.2 79.0
Other Agriculture 5.8 5.9 –6.6 3.8 3.8 30.6
Processed Rice –43.4 13.0 1607.4 –43.4 –43.4 –
Other Food 5.3 5.5 –0.7 5.3 5.2 –
Manufacturing 0.7 –0.1 –0.8 0.7 0.6 –
Services 0.0 –0.1 –0.5 0.1 0.0 –
Transportation –0.1 –0.2 –0.5 –0.0 –0.1 –
Output Consumption Imports
Capital Labor Land
Paddy Rice –9.7 –62.7 –84.6 –0.1 – –68.3
Wheat –8.1 –1.1 1.3 –0.1 – –68.3
Other Agriculture –5.9 –5.0 –0.3 –0.1 – –68.3
Processed Rice –35.8 –50.4 –82.7 –0.1 – –68.3
Other Food –1.8 –1.5 0.6 –0.1 – –68.3
Manufacturing –0.1 –0.1 0.2 –0.1 – –68.3
Services –0.1 –0.1 0.2 –0.1 – –68.3
Transportation –0.1 –0.1 0.2 –0.1 – –68.3
Changes in Price [%]




Note: Labor is chosen as a numeraire, so its price shows no change. 
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Table 10: Welfare Impact in Scenarios M and Q 
Scenario M EV [mil. USD] EV/GDP
Min. Average Max. [%]
Japan 13,004 14,347 15,163 0.35
China –2,391 77 1,358 0.01
India –1,908 –71 937 –0.02
Indonesia –497 –33 372 –0.02
Bangladesh –1,291 –43 504 –0.09
Vietnam –121 37 178 0.11
Thailand –74 179 395 0.16
Philippines –1,043 –41 361 –0.06
US 1,031 2,000 3,027 0.02
Australia –2 156 381 0.05
Rest of Asia –1,558 –511 482 –0.04
Other Countries –1,747 –214 1,346 –0.00
Total 15,867 0.05
Scenario Q EV [mil. USD] EV/GDP
Min. Average Max. [%]
Japan –105,645 –92,775 –80,122 –2.29
China –2,041 353 1,623 0.03
India –1,626 555 1,799 0.12
Indonesia –532 –45 378 –0.03
Bangladesh –1,343 –42 528 –0.09
Vietnam 1,012 1,377 1,740 4.21
Thailand –236 21 252 0.02
Philippines –1,209 –118 314 –0.16
US –2,185 –1,549 –745 –0.02
Australia –623 –579 –527 –0.17
Rest of Asia 2,901 4,699 6,460 0.38
Other Countries –2,058 –540 975 –0.00
Total –88,688 –0.29  
Note: EV/GDP is computed for the average of EV. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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Figure 1:    Productivity Fluctuation of Paddy Rice 























































































Figure 2: Model Structure 
 
Note: CES/CET stands for constant elasticity of substitution/transformation. 
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Figure 3:   Household  Consumption 
 
Note: CES stands for constant elasticity of substitution. 
 
Figure 4:    Impact of Productivity Shocks and Trade Liberalization on Distribution of Japan’s 
Welfare 
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Figure 5:    Distribution of Rice Supply Considering Emergency Stocks 
 
 
Figure 6: Timing of Factor Reallocation and Shocks 
Trade Liberalization and TFP Shock 
Reallocation of Labor 
Equilibrium in Scenarios A, J, and R 
Trade Liberalization 
TFP Shock and 
Quota Imposition 
Reallocation of Labor  Reallocation of All Factors 
Intermediate Equilibrium
Equilibrium in Scenarios M and Q
t
t
-Short-run Adjustment Model 
-Long-run Adjustment Model 
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Figure 7: Impact of Foreign-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare 











































































































































































Figure 8:    Impact of Foreign-made Productivity Shocks on the Import Price of Processed Rice 
for Japan 
































































































Note: The import price refers to the price of composite imports shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 9: Impact of Foreign-made Productivity Shocks on Household Processed Rice 
Consumption in Japan 
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Figure 10: Impact of Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare 











































































































































































Figure 11: Overall Impact of Foreign- and Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare 











































































































































































Figure 12: Overall Impact of Foreign- and Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Calorie Intake 
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Figure 13: Effects of Emergency Stocks on the Domestic Processed Rice Price in Japan 




























































































Figure 14: Effects of Emergency Stocks on the Domestic Processed Rice Consumption in 
Japan 
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Figure 15: Effects of Emergency Stocks on Japan’s Welfare 












































































































































































Figure 16: Effects of Export Quotas on Japan’s Calorie Intake 
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Appendix: Sensitivity Analysis 
  We have conducted sensitivity analyses with respect to four key parameters of our 
CGE model. They are shown as follow. 
 
A.1  Sensitivity Analysis: Price Elasticity of Food Consumption 
  We use 0.1 for the elasticity of substitution 
f ε in the food composite CES function, 
which is approximately equal to the price elasticity of food commodities. However, this 
elasticity might seem too small considering the fact that there are a variety of estimates for 
the price elasticity of rice demand in Japan (Table A.1). As the majority of recent estimates 
(except those by Chern et al. (2002)) suggest the elasticity would be smaller than unity but 
have never converged to any conclusive magnitude to date, we conduct a sensitivity analysis 
with respect to this elasticity. We alternatively assume 1.0 for 
f ε  and find that the 
increases of consumption would be much larger to mitigate the deterioration of domestic 
production of paddy rice to some extent (Table A.2). Imports of rice would be found in a 
larger magnitude. As food demand is assumed to be more price-elastic, price adjustments 
would be less intensified. Welfare impact would be about 40% larger than those in the 
original simulations (Table A.3). 
  Regarding the results of our Monte Carlo simulations, since larger elasticity makes 
the household consumption more sensitive to price falls from rice trade liberalization, 
volatility of EV would be found larger in free trade Scenarios R1, J1, and A1 (Table A.4). As 
Figures A.1–A.4 show, distributions with and without trade liberalization in Scenarios R0, 
R1, J0, J1, A0, and A1 would be also consistently separated from each other with this 
alternative assumption about the elasticity. Figure A.5 also suggests the robustness of our 
finding about the ineffectiveness of the emergency rice stocks demonstrated in Scenario S. 
The means of self-sufficiency rates under free rice trade in Table A.4 would be found about 
two percentage points lower than those in Table 8. In sum, all of our findings are T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
Productivity Shocks and National Food Security for Japan      Page 40 
qualitatively robust irrespective of the assumptions about the elasticity of substitution in 
the food composite CES function. 
 
Table A.1: Estimates of Price Elasticity of Rice Demand 
Estimates of









0.2153 – 0.4091 GMR
1.4161 – 2.7977 PMR
1.07 1972–75
1.21 1976–82










Kako et al. (1997) 0.13 Rice 1970–91 annual FIES
Chino et al. (2000) 0.3315 Rice 1970–1994 annual FIES
Chern (2001) 0.140 Rice 1986–95 pooled FIES




Sawada (1984) 1963–79 annual FIES












Hasebe (1996) 1969–73, 77–86 annual FIES
Chern et al. (2002) 1997 cross-section FIES
 
Note:  Only estimates statistically significant at conventional significance levels and with 
the appropriate sign are shown here. 
/1  GMR: government-marketed rice, PMR: privately marketed rice, and GSPR: 
government standard price rice. 
/2  FIES: Family Income and Expenditure Survey by the Statistical Bureau, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications, Government of Japan.T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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Table A.2: Simulation Results of Scenario T1 for Japan (
f ε =1.0) 
Output Consumption Imports
Paddy Rice –29.9 70.6 1,924.0
Wheat 0.4 –1.4 0.4
Other Agriculture 0.0 –0.2 –1.1
Processed Rice –8.9 73.1 1,847.4
Other Food 0.5 0.3 –1.7
Manufacturing 0.5 –0.3 –1.1
Services –0.0 –0.1 –0.9
Transportation 0.0 –0.2 –0.8
Output Consumption Imports
Paddy Rice –33.8 –41.5 –68.3
Wheat 1.2 1.3 1.3
Other Agriculture –0.1 0.0 0.4
Processed Rice –28.9 –42.3 –78.1
Other Food –0.5 –0.4 0.4
Manufacturing 0.2 0.2 0.5
Services –0.0 –0.0 0.4
Transportation 0.0 0.0 0.4
Changes in Price [%]
Changes in Quantity [%]
 
 
Table A.3: Simulation Results of Scenario T1 for Welfare (













Rest of Asia 302 0.02
Other Countries –697 –0.01
Total 11,758  
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Table A.4: Summary Statistics of Simulation Results (
f ε =1.0) 
Mean
[mil. USD] [%]
T0 0 0 94.0
T1 9,519 0 71.9
R0 –1 20 94.0
R1 9,518 109 71.9
J0 –156 1131 93.9
J1 9,460 581 71.5
A0 –157 1131 93.9
A1 9,458 593 71.6
S –68 1006 91.7








Figure A.1: Impact of Foreign-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare (
f ε =1.0) 










































































































































































Figure A.2: Impact of Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare (
f ε =1.0)  
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Figure A.3: Overall Impact of Foreign- and Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare 
(
f ε =1.0) 











































































































































































Figure A.4: Overall Impact of Foreign- and Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Calorie Intake 
(
f ε =1.0) 






































































































Figure A.5: Effects of Emergency Stocks for Japan’s Welfare (
f ε =1.0) 
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A.2 Sensitivity  Analysis:  Volatility of Productivity 
  There is some uncertainty in our estimates of productivity shocks shown in Table 5. 
We conduct a sensitivity analysis with twice as large standard deviations as those used in 
the main text. The simulation results suggest that the standard deviation of welfare in 
Table A.5 would become about twice as large as the original one in Table 8. The tails of 
welfare distributions would become longer to make the two distributions of welfare (and 
calorie intake) with and without rice trade liberalization closer to each other (Figures 
A.6–A.10). 
  This doubled standard deviation case still qualitatively supports our findings 
drawn from six simulations with Scenarios R0, R1, J0, J1, A0, and A1, except for the point 
that the two welfare distributions with and without trade liberalization slightly overlap 
with each other in Figures A.7 and A.8. The means of welfare under free rice trade would be 
marginally changed while those with rice trade protection would be increased to some extent 
since the larger volatility would exacerbate the slight welfare declines originating from the 
concavity of the utility function. Comparing the results of Scenarios A0 and S, the benefits of 
the emergency stocks would be 265 million US dollars, which is about 2.5 times as much as 
that expected in the original simulations. In this case, this benefit can cover the annual 
storage costs. 
 
Table A.5: Summary Statistics of Simulation Results (with doubled  r σ ) 
Mean
[mil. USD] [%]
T0 0 0 94.0
T1 6,749 0 73.4
R0 5 51 94.1
R1 6,756 189 73.9
J0 –713 2773 93.1
J1 6,613 844 72.3
A0 –710 2777 93.2
A1 6,619 871 72.8
S –445 2365 90.4
Scenario
S.D.
Welfare Mean of Self-
sufficiency
Rate of Rice
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Figure A.6: Impact of Foreign-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare (with doubled  r σ ) 










































































































































































Figure A.7: Impact of Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare (with doubled  r σ ) 










































































































































































Figure A.8: Overall Impact of Foreign- and Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Welfare (with 
doubled  r σ ) 
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Figure A.9: Overall Impact of Foreign- and Domestic-made Shocks on Japan’s Calorie Intake 
(with doubled  r σ ) 





































































































Figure A.10: Effects of Emergency Stocks for Japan’s Welfare (with doubled  r σ ) 











































































































































































A.3  Sensitivity Analysis: Armington Elasticity 
  Elasticity of substitution for the Armington aggregation  ( ) i η − 1 / 1  and elasticity 
of transformation for gross output  ( ) 1 / 1 − i φ  are obtained from the GTAP database version 
6 (Table A.6). Their elasticity is doubled for the elasticity for import variety aggregation 
() i ϖ − 1 / 1  and that for export variety production  ( ) 1 / 1 − i ϕ . We carry out sensitivity 
analysis of our simulation results with respect to the Armington elasticity of substitution for 
the paddy rice and the processed rice sectors in Japan. We alternatively assume 30% larger 
and smaller elasticity for the paddy rice and the processed rice sectors. The results are T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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reported in Figure A.11. In smaller elasticity cases, the deterministic gains from trade 
would become relatively smaller. Consequently, the two distributions of welfare with and 
without rice trade liberalization would get closer to overlap with each other only slightly in 
Scenarios J0, J1, A0, and A1. Our simulation results are in sum robust from a qualitative 
viewpoint. 
 

















Other Food 2.48 1.0
Manufacturing 3.56 – 1.0
S e r v i c e s 1 . 9 4–1 . 0
Transportation 1.90 – 1.0
Sensitivity Analysis
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Panel a) Elasticity of substitution: –30 % 
Mean
[mil. USD] [%]
T0 0 0 94.0
T1 4,768 0 83.6
R0 1 28 94.0
R1 4,769 53 83.8
J0 –213 1201 93.7
J1 4,692 605 83.4
A0 –212 1203 93.8
A1 4,693 609 83.6
S –90 1016 91.7
Scenario
Simulation Results: Indicators for Japan
S.D.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel b) Elasticity of substitution: +30 % 
Mean
[mil. USD] [%]
T0 0 0 94.0
T1 8,962 0 58.7
R0 1 24 94.0
R1 8,965 162 59.2
J0 –176 1140 93.7
J1 8,949 191 58.3
A0 –212 1203 93.8
A1 8,952 256 58.7
S –79 1001 91.9
Scenario
Simulation Results: Indicators for Japan
S.D.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.11: Results of Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t. the Armington Elasticity T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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A.4 Sensitivity  Analysis:  Value Added Aggregation 
While we assume 0.2 for the elasticity of substitution between primary factors in the 
agricultural sectors (Table A.6), we alternatively assume 0.1 (panel a of Figure A.12) and 1.0 
(panel b of Figure A.12) for the elasticity in this sensitivity analysis. The results indicate 
that the less elastic case implies smaller gains from trade and less deterioration of Japan’s 
rice self-sufficiency rate. It should be noted that the two welfare distributions with and 
without trade liberalization never overlap with each other. The benefits of the emergency 
stocks would still fall short of the storage costs. T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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Panel a) Elasticity of substitution=0.1 
Mean
[mil. USD] [%]
T0 0 0 94.0
T1 6,319 0 75.5
R0 4 27 94.0
R1 6,323 122 75.7
J0 –218 1173 93.6
J1 6,272 424 75.2
A0 –215 1176 93.7
A1 6,277 444 75.4
S –87 979 92.0
Scenario
Simulation Results: Indicators for Japan
S.D.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel b) Elasticity of substitution=1.0 
Mean
[mil. USD] [%]
T0 0 0 94.0
T1 8,389 0 60.6
R0 –0 39 94.0
R1 8,392 146 60.8
J0 –509 2499 93.6
J1 8,364 320 60.3
A0 –509 2499 93.7
A1 8,364 329 60.4
S –403 2361 89.7
Scenario
Simulation Results: Indicators for Japan
S.D.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.12: Results of Sensitivity Analysis w.r.t. the elas. of sub. in Value Added T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 




B.1 Model  Structure 
  The full description of our stochastic world trade computable general equilibrium 
model is as follows. 
-Symbols 
Sets 
j i, :  commodities/sectors (other than the food composite) 
fd : food  commodities/sectors 
nfd : non-food  commodities/sectors 
ifd :  non-food commodities plus the food composite 
' , , r s r : regions 
h : factors 
 
Table B.1: List of Abbreviations of Regions and Sectors 
Region Abbreviation Sector Abbreviation
Japan JPN Paddy Rice PDR
China CHN Wheat WHT
India IND Other Agriculture OTA
Indonesia INS Processed Rice PCR
Bangladesh BNG Other Food OTF
Vietnam VTN Manufacturing MAN
Thailand THL Services SRV
Philippines PHL Transportation TRN
US USA
Australia AUS
Rest of Asia ROA




r i X , : household  consumption 
r XFD : food  composite 
g
r i X , : government  consumption 
v
r i X , : investment  uses 
r j i X , , :  intermediate uses of the i-th good by the j-th sector 
r j h F , , : factor  uses 
r j Y , : value  added T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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r j Z , : gross  output 
r i Q , :  Armington composite good 
r i M , : composite  imports 
r i D , : domestic  goods 
r i E , : composite  exports 
s r i T , , :  inter-regional transportation from the r-th region to the s-th region 
r TT :  exports of inter-regional shipping service by the r-th region 
s Q :  composite inter-regional shipping service 
 
p
r S : household  savings 
g
r S : government  savings 
d
r T : direct  taxes 
z
r j T , : production  taxes 
m
r s j T , , : import  tariffs 
e
s r j T , , : export  taxes 
 
XFD
r p :  price of food composite 
q
r i p , :  price of Armington composite goods 
f
r j h p , , : price  of  factors 
y
r j p , :  price of value added 
z
r i p , :  price of gross output 
m
r i p , :  price of composite imports 
d
r i p , :  price of domestic goods 
e
r i p , :  price of composite exports 
t
s r i p , , :  price of goods shipped from the r-th region to the s-th region 
s p :  inter-regional shipping service price in US dollars 
s r, ε :  exchange rates to convert the r-th region’s currency into the s-th region’s 
currency 
r EMS :  release of emergency rice stocks 
 
Exogenous variables and parameters 
f
r S :  current account deficits in US dollars 
r j h FF , , :  factor endowment initially employed in the j-th sector 
r j TFP , : productivity;  ( ) ( ) 0 , 1 or , 1 ~
2
, N N TFP r r PDR σ  
  r σ :  standard deviation of productivity in the paddy rice sector 
r EMS :  capacity of emergency rice stocks T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
Productivity Shocks and National Food Security for Japan      Page 53 
0
,r j Z :  initial amount of gross output 
d
r τ :  direct tax rates 
z
r i, τ :  production tax rates 
m
r s i , , τ :  import tariff rates on inbound shipping from the s-th region 
e
s r i , , τ :  export tax rates on outbound shipping to the s-th region 
s
s r i , , τ :  inter-regional shipping service requirement per unit transportation of the 
i-th good from the r-th region to the s-th region 
 
-Household 
(Utility function:  ∏ =
nfd
p
r nfd r r
r nfd
XFD




  r ∀ ) 















r j h q
r nfd
r nfd p
































, , , ,
α
  r ∀  















r fd r fd r r X XFD    r ∀  
(Note that 
f f ε ε ) 1 ( − = Ψ .) 
  r q
r fd
XFD





























r F p s S
,
, , , ,      r ∀  
 
-Value added producing firm 
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-Import variety aggregation firm 
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-Gross output transforming firm 
 
i) For  PDR i =  (paddy  rice): 
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For simulation with Scenario S: Release of emergency stocks 
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-Export variety producing firm 
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-Inter-regional shipping sector13 
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Foreign exchange rate arbitrage condition 
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B.2  Distributions of Prices and Consumption 
  In the main text, we focused on the impact of productivity shocks and policies on 
welfare. As demonstrated in Figures 7 and 8, we can also compute the distributions of rice 
                                                       
13  For more information on the inter-regional shipping sector, see Hertel (1997). T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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price and consumption for Scenarios J0, J1, A0, and A1. However, we omit many of them so 
as to minimize the number of Figures included in the main text. For the referees’ reference, 
we attach the omitted Figures below. 
 
Figure B.1: Distribution of Processed Rice Consumption by the Household in Japan with 
Domestic-made Shocks 

























































































































Figure B.2: Distribution of Processed Rice Consumption by the Household in Japan with 
Foreign- and Domestic-made Shocks 
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Figure B.3: Distribution of Processed Rice Price for Consumers in Japan with 
Domestic-made Shocks 

































































































Figure B.4: Distribution of Processed Rice Price for Consumers in Japan with Foreign- and 
Domestic-made Shocks 

































































































B.3  Monte Carlo Draws and Productivity Shocks 
  A question about our Monte Carlo simulation results could be made regarding our 
assumption about the distribution of productivity shocks. We plot the distribution of 
productivity for the sample period of our estimation (1990–2004) in Figure B.5 and for all 
the years available in FAOSTAT (1961–2004) in Figure 7, where the productivity 
distributions might not be found to follow a normal distribution. However, considering the 
upward-sloping trend of the productivity (Figure B.7), it is better to use the rice-crop index 
reported by MAFF to examine the distribution (Figure B.8). While there are two years (1945 
and 1993) observed with extraordinarily low yields, the distribution looks normally T. Tanaka & N. Hosoe    November 4, 2008 
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distributed as the central limit theorem predicts. 
 
Figure B.5: Distribution of Paddy Rice Productivity in Japan (1990–2004) 













































































































Figure B.6: Distribution of Paddy Rice Productivity in Japan (1961–2004) 
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Figure B.7: Productivity of Paddy Rice Production in Japan 










1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006  
Source: FAOSTAT. 
 
Figure B.8: Distribution of the Rice-crop Index in Japan (1926–2005) 



















































































Source: MAFF, Sakumotsu Tokei [Crop Statistics]. 
 
  Our Monte Carlo simulation generated random productivity shocks following i.i.d. 
( )
2 , 1 r N σ  (Table B.2, Figure B.9). The summary statistics shows that the means and 
standard deviations are consistent with our original assumption discussed in the main text. 
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics of the Randomized Productivity 
Min. Max. Mean S.D.
Japan 0.75 1.31 1.00 0.08
China 0.91 1.08 1.00 0.03
India 0.87 1.16 1.00 0.04
Indonesia 0.94 1.07 1.00 0.02
Bangladesh 0.84 1.13 1.00 0.05
Vietnam 0.95 1.05 1.00 0.02
Thailand 0.89 1.10 1.00 0.03
Philippines 0.83 1.16 1.00 0.05
US 0.86 1.11 1.00 0.04
Australia 0.74 1.25 1.00 0.09
Rest of Asia 0.94 1.07 1.00 0.02
Other Countries 0.93 1.08 1.00 0.02  
 

































































































  In our analysis, we did not consider any spatial correlations of productivity 
between regions. To justify this assumption, we examined the correlations among the 
residuals of the OLS model (i.e., the productivity shocks) shown in Table 5. Tables B.3 and 
B.4 do not indicate that the spatial correlations have something to do with the distance or 
adjacency between regions. 
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Indonesia -0.5 -0.2 –
Bangladesh -0.5 -0.2 0.1 –
Vietnam -0.3 -0.4 0.5 0.1 –
Thailand -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 –
Philippines -0.7 -0.2 0.7 0.5 0.6 -0.1 –
Japan 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 –
US -0.7 -0.2 0 . 70 . 20 . 30 . 30 . 80 . 2 –
Australia -0.2 0.2 -0.4 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.0 -0.3 –
Rest of Asia -0.6 -0.0 0 . 30 . 50 . 20 . 20 . 5 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 –
Other Countries 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.3 -0.2 –  
 
Table B.4: Correlation between the OLS Residuals 



















Philippines -0.7 0.7 0.6 –
Japan –
US -0.7 0.7 0.8 –
Australia –
Rest of Asia -0.6 0.5 0.5 –
Other Countries –  